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Abstract: Governments have intervened in food, agricultural and fisheries markets through various support programs to 
promote adoption of traceability practices and systems in order to raise food safety levels and increase industry 
competitiveness. The aim of this paper is to investigate intended and unintended effects of participation in such 
supporting programs. Intended effects comprise of the impacts on traceability capacity levels, costs and benefits 
of program participants vs. comparable non-participants. Unintended effects concern the firms’ planning accuracy 
which we propose to measure through deviations of actual from expected outcomes. We conduct our empirical 
analysis based on a sample of 55 Italian fishery businesses which we divide in firms who received support, a 
comparable control group and the remaining sample. Although we find that recipients of government support 
have higher average levels of traceability capacity and overall benefits than the control group, differences are 
not statistically significant. In regards to the unintended effects of government support, we find that recipients 
of government support reported larger deviations of actual from expected benefits than the control group did. 
While these differences were not significant at the aggregate level, significant differences are found at the level of 
specific benefit categories. For example, support recipients had overestimated sales and price related benefits but 
severely underestimated efficiency gains in operations.  The results suggest that the motivation for participating 
in a government support program may not align with the firm’s strategic goals. This misalignment may reduce 
planning accuracy.
Keywords: Traceability; Costs and benefits; Government support; Business planning; Fisheries
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directed at implementing current and proven technology options 
to demonstrate feasibility and value of traceability systems for 
dissemination to industry. 
Investment support programs: Governments may aim at 
enticing a larger number of operations to invest in traceability 
practices by covering part of the costs. Examples are the support 
by the Italian Ministry of Agriculture for adopting traceability 
practices in food and agriculture through Legislative Decree of 
10 April 2006 (Italian Parliament 2006) or support through the 
federally-provincially co-funded Food Safety and Traceability 
Initiative in Ontario, Canada (OMAFRA 2010).
Problem identification
At a minimum, these programs aim to raise the level of 
traceability capacity among participating firms. Spillover effects 
across the sector, e.g. through enhanced information levels and 
the availability of tested technology options could have similar 
effects among non-participants. The effects of government policy 
and programs supporting specific activities on performance in 
the food sector have been documented in various areas (Fields 
2004; Anjini Kochar 2005; Barrett 2002). To the authors’ best 
knowledge, no study has yet been published that assessed the 
impacts of government support for implementing enhanced 
traceability practices or systems. However, in addition to the 
targeted effects, there might be unintended effects of government 
support, in particular on the quality and accuracy of planning. 
On the one hand, one could argue that participation in a support 
program improves planning and implementation due to increased 
resources. On the other, one could also argue that narrow time 
frames, additional requirements and restrictions linked to receiving 
support impact the planning process negatively. 
Significant differences between expected and actual outcomes 
may thus point to a number of issues in support program 
communication, recruitment and implementation. For example, 
lacking awareness of a particular benefit and its discovery 
later on could lead to a “pleasant” surprise of unanticipated 
benefits. Conversely, individual benefits could be overstated in 
a systematic way, because a few successful but untypical cases 
of previous implementation have been highly publicized for 
advertising support programs. Consequently, this would lead to 
an unpleasant surprise when it is discovered after implementation 
that expectations have not been met. Investigating such effects 
can inform decision makers in policy and business by pointing 
to areas of improvement in the design and implementation 
of support programs, as well as in the participation decision. 
However, empirical evidence of an impact of support programs 
for management practices, in particular traceability on a firm’s 
planning process is anecdotal at best. 
Objectives and hypotheses
This paper aims to contribute to closing the two gaps in the 
literature identified in the previous section. Although there is 
no indication in the literature in what direction participation in 
government support impact traceability capacity and planning 
accuracy, the working hypotheses guiding our research are 
Introduction and Importance
Rationale for government support for food 
traceability implementation
Implementing traceability systems in food and agricultural 
businesses produces both private and public good benefits 
(Hobbs, Yeung, and Kerr 2009). Private good benefits, such 
as enhanced market access, efficiency gains in operations and 
supply chain coordination, and liability protection affect financial 
performance of firms directly (Bosona and Gebresenbet 2013; 
Donnelly and Thakur 2010; Golan, Krissoff, and Kuchler 2004; 
Kher et al. 2010; Liddell 2001; Mai et al. 2010; Jones et al. 2004; 
Sparling and Sterling 2004). Examples of public good benefits 
are positive externalities for public health as provided through 
more effective recalls and improved food safety levels (Folinas, 
Manikas, and Manos 2006; Gellynck et al. 2007; Lavoie and 
Forest 2009). However, both types of benefits are characterized 
by considerable uncertainty. Especially for public good benefits, 
realization depends on low-probability events such as foreign 
animal disease outbreaks, food safety incidents or product recalls 
and withdrawals. Further, realization of private benefits requires 
additional investments, as for example in operations analysis 
(Alfaro and Rábade 2009; Wang, Li, and Li 2009), quality 
assurance or marketing (Ortega et al. 2011; Verbeke and Roosen 
2009). 
Uncertainty of private benefits and the fact that a large 
share of the benefits come as positive externalities may lead to 
underinvestment in traceability, i.e. levels of traceability that 
are lower than would be socially optimal. To counter observed 
and suspected market failures of such types, governments have 
intervened in markets in four different ways: 
Regulations: Regulation such as the EU General Food Law 
(European Commission 2002) or the Canadian Health of Animals 
Regulations-Pig Identification (CFIA 2011) lay out industry-wide 
or sector-specific traceability requirements. The implications of 
regulatory traceability requirements for a sector’s international 
competitiveness have been discussed in the literature. However, 
analysis has to be based on hypothetical scenarios of trade 
embargos or lost/gained export market value, because the 
complexity of determinants of international trade flows do not 
allow the isolation of a regulatory impact (Pendell et al. 2011; 
USDA 2009). This paper is thus not concerned with the impacts 
of regulatory amendments and will focus on the other types of 
intervention. 
Research and development: Governments have launched 
programs that aim to increase the uptake of traceability practices 
through improving the information base for investment decisions 
or through direct investment support. Examples are research 
and development programs, such as FOODTRACE (foodtrace.
org) that are intended to support the development and testing of 
technological or institutional innovations to meet industry needs. 
Pilot projects: Pilot projects, such as the EU ADRI.FISH 
project (Asioli, Boecker, and Pirazzoli 2009) or the Ontario 
Traceability Pilot Project Initiative (OMAFRA 2015) are 
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phrased assuming firm performance in these two aspects would 
be improved.
HA1: Recipients of government support for traceability 
implementation have, on average, a higher level of traceability 
capacity than the control group. 
HA2: Firms that have received government support are 
characterized by more accurate planning prior to implementation 
of enhanced traceability compared the control group.
The second working hypothesis needs to be broken down into 
three specific hypotheses as differences in planning accuracy can 
refer to different levels of aggregation and would thus be reflected 
in different data and tests:
HA2a: Recipients of government support have, on average, 
lower deviations of actual outcomes from expected outcomes 
for implementation costs and overall benefits of traceability 
implementation than the control group.
HA2b: Recipients of government support have, on average, 
lower deviations of actual outcomes from expected outcomes 
than the control group for specific implementation costs and for 
specific benefit categories. 
HA2c: Among the group of government support recipients, 
significant deviations of actual from expected outcomes in the 
seven specific implementation cost and five specific benefit 
categories occur less often than among the control group.
The hypothesis tests were performed on data from a small 
sample (n=55) of Italian fish processors. The data were collected 
in 2008 which presents an opportunity to look back at the early 
days of widespread adoption of food traceability in the EU. EC 
regulation 178-2002 (European Commission 2002) had come in 
effect in 2005 and required one step up/one step down traceability 
in all sectors of the food industry, but the regulatory situation was 
still confusing at that time (Regattieri, Gamberi, and Manzini 
2007). Uncertainty around the costs and benefits of traceability 
then was significantly higher than is today and thus may have led to 
biased expectations about the outcomes of investing in traceability 
in general, but possibly more or less so among participants in 
government support programs. 
Methods
Data were collected through a questionnaire that was pre-
tested in spring 2008 and administered by phone among Italian fish 
processors in summer 2008, primarily reaching owner-managers, 
general managers and quality managers. The sample frame had 
been produced by cross-checking the entire population of fish 
processors listed in the most recent Italian Census of Industry and 
Service of (ISTAT 2001) and a list provided in the Yearbook of 
Fishery and Fishing (2007/2008, n.18) . The overall population 
was composed of 415 firms, of which 303 were contacted and 60 
responded, yielding an effective response rate of 20%. Although 
data for assessing the representativeness of the sample is not 
available, it is likely that it is biased towards larger than average 
firms, because the Italian fish processing industry mainly consists 
of very small, locally operating firms whose manager-owners 
tend to be reluctant to participate in surveys. Of the 60 completed 
questionnaires, 55 were usable while the remaining were dropped 
from analysis due to too many missing values. All participating 
firms had invested in enhancing their traceability practices in the 
three years before the survey.
Data structure
The questionnaire had 30 questions in four sections: (1) general 
company information, including supplier and customer types and 
structure and food quality and safety systems; (2) government 
support for traceability implementation; (3) traceability capacity; 
(4) overall and specific costs and benefits of traceability. We 
now briefly describe how the variables required for testing the 
hypotheses were coded and further processed for data analysis:
General company information: A total of 13 questions were 
asked about key characteristics of the firm, such as location, size, 
employee numbers, stages of supply chain at which firm is active, 
variety of inputs and outputs, customer and trade structure as well 
as quality and safety management systems currently employed or 
certified to. The data from this set of variables was used for the 
propensity matching score processes to obtain a control group that 
is comparable to the group of support recipients.
Government support received: Respondents were asked 
whether they had received any support from a municipal, 
provincial, regional, national or supra-national government 
agency for traceability implementation. If so, they were asked 
to further specify the type of support and how useful the support 
was. Nine firms indicated to have received government support.  
Traceability capacity: Respondents were asked a series of 
questions about the defining features of their traceability systems, 
i.e. precision, breadth and depth (Golan, Krissoff, and Kuchler 
2004). Precision, also called granularity (Karlsen et al. 2012), 
refers to the smallest traceable resource unit (TRU) (Moe 1998). 
We provided five answer options with scores ranging from one to 
five for each the input and the output side, which were also added 
together for an overall measure. Breadth refers to the different 
types of information that can be linked to a TRU. We provided a list 
of ten information categories, plus two ‘other’ options. A category 
checked increased the participant’s traceability breadth score by 
one so that scores could range from zero to 12. Traceability depth 
refers to the ability to track and trace TRUs along the supply chain 
and is also interpreted as a measure of chain integration in regards 
to information exchange. In our survey, respondents were asked 
whether they were able to do so beyond the regulatory requirement 
of one step up and one step down, separately for the input and the 
output side. Scores could thus range from zero (direct supplier and 
direct customer only) to two (beyond direct supplier and direct 
customer). 
Traceability costs and benefits: The measurement of 
expected and actual costs and benefits of traceability is the basis 
for testing hypothesis 2 to determine whether government support 
has an impact on the planning process. While this impact would 
ultimately become visible in the participating firms’ financial 
performance, its identification and quantification in empirical 
analysis faces significant challenges. We therefore suggest 
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• They need to simultaneously influence the program 
participation decision and the outcome variable(s). 
• They must not be affected by participation or the 
anticipation of it. 
Hence, if variables are not measured before the participation or 
their measurement does not explicitly refer to the pre-participation 
time, a strong rationale needs to be provided for assuming that 
they have remained stable over the investigation period, i.e. in the 
case of this research the three years before the survey. The chosen 
model with the selected variables produces the propensity score (to 
participate in a government support program), e.g. the estimated 
probability of belonging to the group of program participants. 
After obtaining the propensity score, a matching algorithm needs 
to be chosen and the results should be subjected to performance 
assessment and sensitivity analysis (Caliendo and Kopeinig 
2005). We now provide an overview of the propensity matching 
score process we applied; a comprehensive documentation of 
it, including the rationales for variable selection is provided in 
Appendix 1. 
We used SPSS version 17.1 to perform a logistic regression 
with the dependent variable being ‘having received government 
support’ (1) and ‘not having received support’ (0). As independent 
variables we chose the following firm characteristics (with 
corresponding codes):
Location: Being located in the northern region ‘Region Nord’ 
(1) vs. rest of the country (0). 
Firm size: 25 or less full time employees (1) vs. more than 
25 full time employees (0). Annual revenue brackets could not be 
used for the matching process, because four respondents had not 
revealed their firm’s revenue bracket.
Primary production: Processor with upstream integration 
(1) vs. those without direct involvement in primary production/
harvesting (0). 
Quality management system certification: Having been 
certified according to one ISO9000, International Food Standard 
(IFS) or British Retail Consortium (BRC) (1) vs. those that were 
not certified according to either of the three (0).
Strategic marketing choice: We differentiated between three 
types of strategic marketing choices: own brand (1) vs. no own 
brand; licensed production for another brand (1) vs. no licensed 
production (0); producing for no name product (1) vs. no such 
production (0). 
Due to sample size, only the simple ‘nearest neighbor(s)’ 
or ‘caliper and radius’ matching algorithms were feasible. In 
addition, the propensity score distributions of support program 
participants and the rest of the sample were rather different. While 
the former had a large share of high scores (0.60 or higher), but 
few medium (0.10 to 0.60) and low scores (less than 0.10), the 
latter had hardly any high scores and a large shares of medium 
and low scores. A fixed caliper or radius algorithm would have 
thus lead to an over representation of low scoring firms and under 
representation of high and medium scoring firms. Therefore, we 
assessing such an impact on the deviation of actual outcomes, 
i.e. costs and benefits of the traceability implementation process 
from expected outcomes. In their survey study of the Canadian 
dairy processing industry Sparling et al. (2006) identified such 
a discrepancy between motivations to invest in traceability, i.e. 
expected importance of benefits, and actual performance, i.e. the 
importance of benefits after implementation. Larger deviations 
of actual from expected outcomes, regardless of their direction, 
would point to less effective or accurate planning. Similarly, at 
the group level, an increasing share of firms without major or 
noteworthy deviations can be interpreted as an indicator of more 
accurate and effective planning. More specifically, costs and 
benefits were measured as follows: 
Traceability implementation Costs: Respondents were 
first asked to rate the total one-time costs of implementation 
relative to their annual revenue on a scale from 1 (very low) to 
9 (very high), for both expected before and actual costs after 
implementation. For both, total costs were further broken down 
into five specific cost categories - equipment and software; 
certification, consultants and audit; staff and workforce time; 
training; supplies and materials). Respondents were then asked to 
allocate 100 points across the five categories according to their 
importance, or: share in total costs. To familiarize respondents 
with this constant sum scale examples were given, such as, “If 
all categories are equally important, give 20 points to each.” 
Respondents were also asked to rate expected and actual operating 
costs of their traceability practices or system on the same scale 
from 1 to 9, but without further breakdown in categories. Since 
this breakdown is important for testing hypothesis 2, operating 
costs are not included in the analysis.
Traceability benefits: Respondents were also asked to rate 
the benefits of their current traceability practices relative to their 
annual revenue on a scale from 1 (very low) to 9 (very high) for 
both expected before and actual benefits after implementation. For 
both, total benefits were further broken down into seven specific 
benefit categories - regulatory requirements; consumer trust; 
customer requirements and trust; market share/access and price 
premium; customer complaints, recall and liability; operations 
management; supply chain management.  The same constant sum 
scale used for costs, was used to elicit the expected and actual 
importance of each of the seven benefit categories. 
Propensity score matching for group comparisons
In order to test the two hypotheses and minimize bias, it was 
necessary to determine an appropriate control group of firms that 
had not received government support. Propensity score matching 
is a method of choice for this objective (Rosenbaum and Rubin 
1983; Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005; Antonioli, Marzucchi, and 
Montresor 2012). It builds on the assumption that selection into 
a support program is based on observable characteristics. The 
selection decision is typically modeled through a discrete choice 
model (Train 2009). For the characteristics to enter as variables 
into the propensity score matching process, they have to meet the 
following criteria (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005):
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chose the ‘five nearest neighbors’ approach with replacing. Using 
replacement lead to an increasing average quality of matching and 
a decreased bias, which is of particular interest with data were the 
propensity score distribution is different in the treatment and in 
the control group (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005). 
We then chose to deviate from the standard PSM procedure 
for pragmatic reasons reflecting the fact that the small sample size 
did not allow for more elaborate model testing. Instead of using 
the matching scores of one model to select the control group, we 
chose to use three models that differed in regards to the strategic 
marketing choice specification. We finally selected those firms for 
the control group that had been selected into the control group 
for each of the three models. This was done because there was 
no clear a priori reasoning available to determine which strategic 
marketing specification would be more conducive to participation. 
While the three models were similar in overall fit, the number of 
firms selected into the control group ranged from 17 to 22. The 
final selection contained nine firms that had been selected into the 
control group in each of the three models. Their distribution of 
matching scores was similar to the group of nine participants that 
had received government support for traceability implementation. 
Finally, the identification of the participation (or treatment) 
effect through testing the hypotheses in most cases requires the 
weighting of support recipients and control group members with 
their respective propensity scores. We used the arithmetic mean 
of the scores of the three models for this purpose. Reporting of 
descriptive results will also include the remaining 37 (=55-9-
9) firms of the sample to provide an additional anchor point for 
evaluation of the results. 
Operationalization of hypothesis tests
After identification of a control group of firms that had not 
received government support, we operationalized the variables 
that were relevant for the hypothesis testing as follows:
Hypothesis 1
For each of the three scores of traceability capacity, compare 
the group means of recipients and control group.
Hypothesis 2a
For overall implementation costs and overall benefits 
separately, calculate the average absolute deviation of actual from 
expected outcome for each firm and compare the group means of 
recipients and control group.  
Hypothesis 2b
Sum absolute difference of actual from expected outcome 
for the specific implementation cost categories for each firm and 
compare group means of recipients and control group. Do the 
same for specific benefit categories. 
Hypothesis 2c
Conduct repeat measure test of expected and actual outcome 
for each specific implementation cost category and each specific 
benefit category separately for the recipient group and the control 
group. 
Results 
Description of firm characteristics
The first descriptive results are directed at comparing firm 
characteristics between the group of government support recipients 
and the control group. These and the descriptive statistics for the 
remainder of the sample are shown in Table 1.
With the exception of the strategic marketing variable 
“Producing under license” the recipient group and the control 
group are quite similar. They both differ most strikingly from the 
remainder of the sample in two aspects, firm size and involvement 
in primary production, i.e. harvest of seafood. In regards to the 
former, participants in support programs and the firms in the 
control group tend to be smaller than the remainder of the sample. 
Of the eleven processors engaged in primary production in the 
sample, six were among the recipients of government support 
and the remaining five have been matched into the control group. 
Hence, none are found in the remaining sample of 37. Of the 
additionally shown variables in Table 1, the median revenue 
category confirms the size difference between groups but also 
highlights that the firms in the remainder of the sample are 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of firm characteristics of three subsamples.
Variable Received support (n=9) Control group (n=9) Remainder of sample (n=37)
Region Nord (share) 44% 44% 57%
Labour force full time (median) 11-25 11-25 26-50
Primary producer (share) 67% 56% 0%
ISO9001, IFS or BRC certified (share) 56% 78% 43%
Having own brand (share) 89% 89% 89%
Producing under brand licence (share) 22% 78% 46%
Producing for no name product (share) 33% 44% 35%
Traceability certification** (share) 44% 11% 5%
Exporting to EU countries (share) 89% 78% 46%
Revenue bracket*  (median) $3.7-7.3million $1.5-3.7 million $14.6-36.6 million
*Original brackets in survey were in EURO which have been transformed with the 2008 average annual exchange rate of USD 1.0000/
EURO 0.6831 (OANDA.com).** Respondents were asked whether they had been certified according to any of ISO 22005 and the 
Italian standards UNI 10939, UNI 11020 or any other traceability standard.
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considerably larger than those in the recipient and control group. 
The share of firms that export to other EU member states also 
shows a major difference between recipients and control group on 
the one hand and the remainder of the sample on the other. 
Government support
Of the nine firms that had received public support six had 
received it from one source, two from two and one from three 
sources. The source of support most often stated was the municipal 
government (5), followed by the provincial government (4), the 
regional government (2), while the national and EU level were 
each mentioned once. Table 2 shows how the different types of 
government support in traceability system implementation were 
rated. 
Advice and financial support for purchasing equipment, 
hardware or software was rated most positively. While assistance 
in preparation of certification or final audit and technical assistance 
and training were still rated neutral to positive overall, the rating 
of legal assistance was rated very negatively. The average scores 
per firm ranged from a minimum of 2.3 (one firm) to a maximum 
of 5.0 (three firms) with 4.0 (two firms), 3.3 (two firms) and 3.0 
(one firm) in between. 
Hypothesis testing 
For testing the hypotheses, we first restate each working 
hypothesis assuming that participation in support programs 
has had a positive effect on traceability capacity and planning 
accuracy. 
Hypothesis 1: Recipients of government support for 
traceability implementation have, on average, a higher level of 
traceability capacity than the control group.
With the exception of the breadth indicator the recipient group 
indeed does have higher average scores than the control group 
and also than the remainder of the sample which consists of larger 
firms than the group of support recipients (Table 3). However, the 
only statistically significant difference is found for the precision 
indicator for output - but at the 10% significance level only. 
Hence, the null for hypothesis one cannot be rejected. 
Table 3, further shows average expected and actual 
implementation cost and benefit scores for the three subsamples. 
None of the differences between recipient and control group are 
significant at the 10% level. However, it is noteworthy that the 
observable difference in reported cost levels between the three 
subsamples may be linked to the difference in average firm size: 
the control group had the smallest median revenue size and the 
highest implementation and operating cost scores, while the 
remaining sample which has clearly the largest average firm size 
has the lowest mean cost scores.  
Hypothesis 2a: Recipients of government support have, on 
average, lower deviations of actual outcomes from expected 
outcomes for implementation costs and overall benefits of 
traceability implementation than the control group. 
The average scores of implementation costs and overall 
benefits in Table 3 tend to understate the true extent of deviations 
of actual outcomes from expected ones, as negative and positive 
deviations cancel each other out at the group level. We thus report 
two indicators of deviation between expected and actual outcomes 
of traceability implementation in Table 4 that can be interpreted 
as indicators of planning accuracy:
• The group mean of the absolute deviation between expected 
and actual outcome, and 
• The share of firms within a group reporting no deviation of 
actual from expected outcomes -we refer to them as ‘non-
deviators.’
In Table 4, again, no significant differences are found between 
recipient group and control group at 10% significance level. But 
the following pattern can be observed in regards to planning 
accuracy: The recipient group performs only slightly worse than 
Not useful at 
all (1) 2 3 4
Very useful 
(5)
Purchase Equipment/Hardware/Software - - 2 2 2
Certification/Audit - 1 2 1 3
Technical Assistance & Training - 2 2 1 1
Legal Assistance 3 - - - -
Other (e.g. for structures) - - 1 - 1
Table 2: Rating of different types of government support for traceability implementation.
Table 3: Mean scores* of traceability capacity and cost-benefit indicators for 3 subsamples.
Subsamples/ Indicators Breadth Input precision
Output 
precision Depth
Expected/actual 
overall benefits
Expected/actual 
implement. costs
Support recipients (n=9) 13.4 a 3.6 a 3.6 a 1.4 a 6.8 / 6.5 5.5 / 5.5
Control group (n=9) 13.8 a 2.3 a 2.1 b 1.2 a 5.5 / 5.4 6.2 / 6.4
Remaining sample (n=37) 13.9 3.3 3.4 1.0 6.8 / 6.6 4.9 / 4.7
*Each firms score was weighted with its propensity score. Higher scores indicate higher levels of traceability capacity and higher levels 
of benefits and costs. a, b Different superscripts for given capacity indicator indicate significant difference between support recipients and 
control group at 10% significance level for independent samples t-test.
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the control group on implementation costs but much worse on 
benefits. This pattern is now investigated more closely when using 
the importance scores of specific implementation cost and benefits 
categories. 
Hypothesis 2b: Recipients of government support have, on 
average, lower deviations of actual outcomes from expected 
outcomes than the control group for specific implementation costs 
and for specific benefit categories. 
As was described in the methods section in more detail, 
respondents were asked to allocate 100 points across five specific 
cost categories and also 100 points across seven benefit categories 
according to their respective importance or share in implementation 
costs and overall benefits as expected prior to and as actually 
observed after traceability implementation. For an individual firm 
the absolute deviations are summed across the categories and, 
hence, means reported in Table 5 are the group means of these 
sums. For the recipient group, for example, absolute deviations of 
importance scores between expected and actual implementation 
costs, on average summed up to 7.48 points while the deviations 
for benefits summed up to 32.22 points per firm. Since there were 
five cost categories and seven benefit categories, these scores 
cannot be compared directly but a higher score indicates larger 
deviations of actual from expected outcomes. 
The pattern observed for overall implementation costs and 
overall benefits in Table 4 is also observable among the numbers 
presented in Table 5. Planning by recipients of government 
support is considerably more accurate for implementation costs 
than for benefits. For the control group, there is little difference 
between the planning accuracies of costs and of benefits. Due to 
the small sample size, however, none of the differences in group 
means were found to be statistically significant at the 10% level 
or lower. 
Hypothesis 2c: Among government support recipients, 
significant deviations of actual from expected outcomes in the 
seven specific implementation cost and five specific benefit 
categories occur less often than for the control group.
We finally look at the specific benefit and implementation 
cost categories to determine whether individual categories have 
been systematically over or under estimated at the planning 
stage. Following the argumentation by Boecker et al. (2014) that 
benefits are characterized by larger uncertainty than costs, we 
would generally expect more pronounced deviations of actual 
from expected outcomes for benefits than for implementation 
costs. Indeed, no statistically significant differences between 
expected and actual implementation costs were found for any 
of the five cost categories for either the recipients or the control 
group. However, for the seven benefit categories a number of 
significant differences were found and the frequency of significant 
differences varies greatly between the recipient and control group. 
We therefore focus solely on the seven benefit categories for 
which the results of paired samples t-tests are reported in Table 6. 
The corresponding results for implementation cost categories are 
reported in Appendix 2. 
While only one significant difference (α=5%)  between 
expected and actual benefits was observed for the control group, 
Cost / benefit
Variables
Support recipients  
(n=9)
Control group 
(n=9)
Remaining sample 
(n=37)
Number of non-
deviators*
 Absolute 
deviation 
mean**
  Number of 
non-deviators*
Absolute 
deviation 
mean**
Number of non-
deviators*
Absolute deviation 
mean**
Implementation costs 5 (56%) 0.67 5 (56%) 0.48 9 (24%) 1.27
Benefits overall 3 (33%) 1.76 4 (44%) 0.62 16 (43%) 0.80
Table 4: Indicators of deviation between expected and actual implementation and operating costs and benefits overall for three 
subsamples.
*Number of firms with deviation score of zero (expected outcome = actual outcome). ** Each firm’s deviation score was weighted with 
its propensity score. Deviation scores for individual firms could range from 0 (no deviation) to 8 (maximum deviation).
Cost / benefit
Variables
Support recipients  
(n=9)
Control group 
(n=9)
Remaining sample 
(n=37)
Number of non-
deviators*
Mean of  
absolute 
deviation sum **
Number  
of non-
deviators*
Mean of  
absolute 
deviation sum **
Number  
of non-
deviators*
Mean of  
absolute 
deviation sum **
Five 
implementation 
cost categories 
4 (44%) 7.48 3 (33%) 20.20 11 (30%) 28.75
Seven benefit 
categories 2 (22%) 32.22 2 (22%) 21.66 12 (32%) 14.04
Table 5: Indicators of deviation of importance scores between expected and actual implementation cost and benefit categories for three 
subsamples.
*Number of firms with zero deviation between expected and actual outcome for all categories.**Deviation scores were summed across 
categories for individual firms.
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four out of the seven benefit categories shifted significantly in 
their importance after implementation among the recipients of 
government support: 
Benefits in the areas of consumer trust and market share/price 
premium were reported to be significantly lower than had been 
expected before traceability implementation. 
Benefits in the areas of complaints/recalls/liability issues and 
operational efficiency were reported to be significantly larger than 
anticipated.  
Three of the four categories with significant differences also 
exhibit a striking pattern in the distribution of deviations. The 
reported deviation of seven of the nine firms was in the direction 
of the group average, while two reported zero deviations and none 
deviations in the other direction. Another difference between the 
two groups is found in the average share of firms that reported no 
deviations between expected and actual importance of a benefit. 
It is 27% for the recipient group and 41% for the control group, 
which could also point to less accurate planning among recipients 
of government support (Table 6). 
Discussions
The paper provides an initial analysis into the effects of 
firms’ participation in government support programs for seafood 
traceability implementation on their planning accuracy, as 
captured by deviations of actual from expected costs and benefits. 
Before discussing implications of our results for policy makers and 
managers, we need to point out three limitations of our study. First, 
the sample size is small so that only nine firms that had received 
support and the same number of firms in the control group are 
included in the analysis directly. However, when referring to the 
results for hypothesis 2c, the magnitude of deviations in the four 
benefit categories with significant deviations among the support 
recipients is much larger than any in the control group, ranging 
(in absolute terms) from 5.7 for ‘improved operational efficiency’ 
to 10.3 for ‘market access, sales growth or price premium.’ The 
only significant difference found in the control group is 3.4 for 
‘meeting regulatory requirements’.
Second, it appears that involvement in primary production, 
i.e. seafood harvesting was important for eligibility for support 
program participation. Third, the analysis does not focus on 
Specific benefit categories
Support recipients  
(n=9)
Control group 
(n=9)
Remaining sample 
(n=37)
Meeting current or anticipated 
regulatory requirements 
Expected 12.2 18.2 26.1
Actual 13.8 21.6 25.5
t-value 1.414 2.590* 0.721
% Distribution a 44/33/22 56/33/11 24/41/35
Increasing consumer trust 
Expected 21.1 13.3 15.8
Actual 15.2 12.6 14.6
t-value 2.491* 0.728 2.078*
% Distribution a 0/22/78 11/44/44 16/46/38
Meeting customers’ 
requirements
Expected 17.8 16.2 15.3
Actual 20.2 16.7 16.9
t-value 1.028 0.282 1.879
% Distribution a 44/33/22 33/22/44 27/49/24
Market access, sales growth, or 
price premium
Expected 17.2 11.2 9.4
Actual 6.9 7.3 8.4
t-value 2.638* 1.135 1.907
% Distribution a 0/22/78 11/56/33 14/46/41
Food safety, reduced liability or 
recall risk 
Expected 11.1 13.4 10.5
Actual 18.4 13.6 10.7
t-value 2.434* 0.112 0.340
% Distribution a 56/33/11 33/33/33 30/43/27
Increased operational efficiency
Expected 7.6 10.9 14.1
Actual 13.3 12.9 14.4
t-value 2.364* 0.932 0.305
% Distribution a 78/22/0 33/44/22 35/38/27
Improving supply chain 
efficiency
Expected 13.0 16.7 8.9
Actual 12.2 15.2 9.5
t-value 0.417 2.004 1.116
% Distribution a 33/22/44 0/56/44 22/62/16
Table 6: Paired samples t-test of expected and actual specific benefit importance scores.
*aProportion of firms with actual importance score of benefit higher than/equal to/lower than the expected one. Difference between 
actual and expected importance score is significant at 5% (paired samples t-test).
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a specific support program but captures various support type 
combinations from different sources so that the common feature 
is that support was received between 2005 and 2008.  Hence, the 
results of the hypothesis tests have to be interpreted with respect 
to that time frame when uncertainty about traceability benefits and 
costs was higher than today. 
However, extending the perspective to include the remainder 
of the sample, the question is raised whether the observed 
significant differences among support recipients in hypothesis 2c 
are entirely unique or possibly reflect generally existing biases 
in expectations about benefits of traceability during the time 
period of investigation. As can be seen from Table 6, for the four 
benefit categories with significant deviations for the group of 
government recipients, the control group and remaining sample 
show deviations in the same direction but only one is statistically 
significant at the 5% level: ‘increasing consumer trust’ for the 
remaining sample. For the first hypothesis, although the group of 
support recipients reported higher average levels of traceability 
capacity and higher levels of benefits than the control group, these 
differences were not significant. But even if sample size had been 
sufficiently large and the same direction of differences been found 
statistically significant, those findings could not be used to justify 
support programs, as no cost information at the program level was 
included in the analysis.  
More importantly from the perspective of managerial and 
policy implications, we found evidence of possible unintended side 
effects of government support when analyzing deviations between 
expected and actual outcomes for specific benefit categories. 
Recipients of government support had reported greater deviations 
of actual from expected specific benefits than the control group. 
More specifically, they over estimated benefits from increased 
consumer trust and market gains and under estimated benefits 
from reduced consumer complaints, recall and liability risk, as 
well as increased operational efficiency. When investigating 
the four benefit categories more closely for the control group 
and the remaining sample, we found the same direction of the 
deviation. Further, we did not find similar patterns of consistent 
deviations of actual from expected implementation costs among 
the three subsamples. Hence, we conclude: there may have been 
a general misperception of the importance of these four specific 
areas of traceability benefits during the time period of 2005 to 
2008, and this misperception may have been amplified through the 
communication related to the recruitment efforts of the support 
programs captured in our sample. 
While we don’t have access to data to subject either of the above 
statements to an empirical test, it has to be pointed out that the 
second effect may only have materialized, if firms participating in 
support programs did not have a clear strategic vision of the benefits 
they wanted to achieve through traceability implementation. This 
would have also kept them from investigating more closely the 
reliability of any communicated benefit claims. 
The management implications of our findings primarily apply 
to decision makers in small firms with upstream integration 
of primary production, because such operations had been 
predominantly selected into the support programs, and also into 
our control group: 
• A clear strategic perspective should drive the decision to 
participate in a government support program, including 
the eventual choice of the capacity level of the traceability 
system to be implemented. 
• This could lead to a better understanding of how realistic 
strong benefit claims are and whether any benefits could 
be over or under rated. Less pronounced deviations of 
actual from expected benefits would follow and lead to 
significantly higher overall benefits from traceability, or 
greater cost-effectiveness in their achievement. 
• Among the critical success factors discussed in the 
literature, the recommendation that traceability systems 
be designed based on the needs of the users (Karlsen et 
al. 2012) is most relevant in the context of our study. For 
some users low levels of precision, depth and breadth are 
required to accomplish their goals, while other users’ goals 
require greater capacity. According to Fonsah (2006), 
operators should perform a SWOT analysis and consider 
their core values to help determine what is most appropriate 
for their situation. 
Our results also support the suggestion by Stanford et al. (2001) 
that government support in food safety practices can be of crucial 
importance for establishing well-functioning traceability systems, 
also benefiting governments, consumers and industry. Tompkin 
(2001) also recommended that government support programs 
provide greater clarity in the interpretation of new regulatory 
requirements for firms to significantly benefit in the decision 
making process of implementing traceability which in turn would 
lead to more accurate planning. Interestingly, the corresponding 
support type, i.e. legal assistance, had received by far the lowest 
satisfaction ratings in our sample. 
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